Abstract—This article proposes a game-theoretic model for financing education informatization, incorporating Cyber Security (CS) considerations within a university context. The model formalizes the financial interactions between stakeholders, addressing the critical interdependence between educational quality and cybersecurity. This interdependence necessitates optimized resource allocation to establish a secure and innovative educational environment. The core challenge investigated is the strategic balance between investments in digitalization and the costs of associated information security measures. The novelty of our approach lies in applying a differential quality game with a bilinear structure, where the participants’ financial states are governed by a system of differential equations. Classical methods for solving linear differential games are inapplicable here, as the bilinear structure prevents the use of the Cauchy formula to solve the system. Furthermore, the positional differential game approach is also unsuitable, as the model permits the use of non-measurable controls by an opponent. These mathematical challenges underscore the work’s significance, contributing not only as a tool for CS policy but also through its theoretical advancements. Within this framework, the model identifies player preference sets and optimal strategies, findings which are validated through a computational experiment. The visualization of the preference set for the first player—the Computer Security Center (CSC)—demonstrates the model’s practical utility in resolving financing dilemmas for education informatization amid cybersecurity constraints. The study’s impact lies in providing a robust analytical tool for developing optimal resource allocation strategies. This contributes significantly to the sustainable development of Higher Education (HE) systems navigating digital transformation and escalating cyber threats.
 
Keywords—higher education, informatization, cybersecurity, game theory, scenarios, resources, optimal strategy


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