

SecureEdge-IoT: An Intelligent Adaptive Cryptographic Model for Zero-trust Data Confidentiality in Resource-constrained Edge Computing Networks

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Abstract—With the increase in the number of Internet of Things (IoT) devices and the advantage of edge computing, it has become a crucial issue to make data confidential. In this paper a novel intelligent adaptive cryptographic model termed SecureEdge-IoT that follows the principles of zero trust will be presented to employ a zero-trust approach for the resource limited edge computing networks. Our approach integrates context-aware lightweight encryption and machine learning-based access control mechanisms to be able to protect sensitive data at the edge nodes. The SecureEdge-IoT model applies two algorithms that sync together, called the Adaptive Lightweight Encryption Algorithm (ALEA) and the Dynamic Access Control Protocol (DACP). Experimental results demonstrate that SecureEdge-IoT reduces encryption time by 52%, energy consumption by 49.5%, memory usage by 48.4%, and increases throughput by 77.9% compared to traditional AES-based methods, achieving an overall weighted performance improvement of 23.7%, computed as a weighted composite index of the normalized improvements in encryption time, energy consumption, memory usage, while maintaining equivalent security strength. Statistical analysis at three comparative studies validates the efficiency and effectiveness of proposed model.

Keywords—SecureEdge-IoT, zero-trust architecture, intelligent cryptography, edge computing security, adaptive Internet of Things (IoT) protection

I. INTRODUCTION

The explosive growth of Internet of Things (IoT) ecosystems has completely re-defined data processing paradigms and edge computing formed as a crucial infrastructure building block. As more data that needs to remain secret is now processed and stored on edge nodes, the importance of ensuring data confidentiality has risen. Traditional cloud-centric security models aren't up to the task in edge environments because of resource limitations,

latency considerations, and distributed characteristics of IoT. Edge computing pushes computation and data storage toward data sources, lowering latency and bandwidth consumption. Section I is the introduction. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section II reviews related work; Section III describes our proposed methodology; Section IV discusses experimental results and Section V concludes this paper. However, this distributed approach comes along with new security issues, especially with respect to data confidentiality. IoT devices are often used in unsecured environments and have limited computational resources, so they are subject to a range of attacks such as eavesdropping, man-in-the-middle attacks and physical tampering.

The main difficulty is playing the balancing game between security needs and resources. traditional encryption algorithms, although secure, are often too resource-intensive for IoT-constrained devices. Quantitatively, current IoT security solutions exhibit significant resource constraints: traditional AES implementations consume 78.9 ± 5.4 mJ per encryption operation and require 124.5 KB of memory, exceeding the energy budgets and memory capacity of many battery-powered sensors (typical thresholds: 50 mJ/operation, 80 KB memory). This resource gap necessitates lightweight yet secure alternatives tailored for edge computing environments. Moreover, the static access control mechanisms do not accommodate the dynamic nature of the IoT environments where roles and level of trust for devices can shift fast.

This paper overcomes such challenges by introducing an intelligent adaptive cryptographic model for zero-trust edge-based IoT environment, called SecureEdge-IoT. The terminologies used in the paper are essential components of the proposed SecureEdge-IoT model. Each term serves a specific purpose Adaptive Lightweight Encryption Algorithm (ALEA)—Core encryption mechanism, Dynamic Access Control Protocol (DACP)—Access control framework, Edge Security Manager (ESM), Adaptive Encryption Engine (AEE), Dynamic Access

Controller (DAC)—System architecture components. All terms are actively used in the implementation and evaluation. Our contributions are: (1) A new context-aware lightweight encryption algorithm that adaptively adjusts security level based on machine learning principle. (2) A dynamic access control protocol based on mathematical trust evolution models. (3) A comprehensive experimental validation that shows superior performance of the SecureEdge-IoT model in comparison to existing approaches.

II. RELATED WORK

A. Edge Computing

Wang *et al.* [1] suggested a common framework of edge computing which guarantees efficiency and confidentiality by coded distributed computing. As an exemplary problem, they tackled in a collaborative manner task distribution and linear code design to perform secure computation using matrix multiplication. The authors came up with an effective algorithm of task allocation and designed both secure coded computing schemes which include and exclude redundant computation. The effectiveness and optimization of the proposed approach was proved during extensive simulations.

Suomalainen *et al.* [2] examined the cybersecurity challenges in intelligent, rapidly deployable 6G-based tactical networks for public safety operations. It highlights the dual role of machine learning in both orchestrating autonomous edge-enabled networks and expanding the threat landscape. The study evaluates risk analysis methods, presents joint risk prioritization results, and proposes a standards-aligned ML-driven security architecture for protecting mission-critical edge assets.

Mahadevappa *et al.* [3] proposed a secure edge computing model using machine learning for intrusion detection and isolation in IoT networks. The IDS integrates Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) with Logistic Regression (LR) to achieve fast and accurate detection. The system isolates compromised devices without alerting neighboring nodes, preventing further intrusion. Experimental results show superior performance with 96.56% accuracy, 95.78% precision, and rapid training time.

B. IoT Data Protection

Bhatt *et al.* [4] investigated access control mechanisms for IoT platforms using role-based and policy-based models to secure devices and cloud resources. However, their approach does not adequately address dynamic attribute-level authorization, which is the focus of our proposed model.

Zhu *et al.* [5] studied fine-grained access control mechanism of edge computing environment. They identified that static access control policies were not enough for dynamic IoT scenarios and present adaptation mechanisms able to respond to changing scenarios.

Existing adaptation mechanisms rely on manual policy updates with 15–30 ms propagation delays, which are unsuitable for IoT environments where trust levels fluctuate in seconds. These models lack mathematical formalization of trust evolution and do not incorporate machine learning for autonomous adaptation.

Sharma and Bhushan [6] discussed protection in IoT environments in particular, the issue of confidentiality mechanisms has been emphasized, created a detailed survey about security issues in IoT which includes data confidentiality being one of the most critical issues. They pushed the point that protecting mechanisms should take into consideration the full data lifecycle—from collecting to storing to transmitting data.

Wang and Zhang [7] proposed a blockchain-based solution to guarantee the integrity and the confidentiality of the data in IoT systems. this approach offered good security guarantees; the computational cost made it an inappropriate choice for resource-constrained edge devices. This limitation was the motivation for the need for more efficient approaches. Specifically, the blockchain-based approach incurs average latency of 187 ms per transaction due to consensus mechanisms, making it unsuitable for real-time IoT applications requiring sub-50ms response times. Additionally, blockchain storage requirements (>1 GB for ledger maintenance) exceed the capacity of resource-constrained edge devices.

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C. Access Control in IoT

Zaidi *et al.* [8] proposed a blockchain-enabled ABAC model for IoT that eliminates device-level ACLs, utilizing smart contracts for time-bound access and a multichain Proof of Authority (PoA) architecture to optimize scalability, prevent tampering, and resolve centralized privacy flaws.

D. Lightweight Cryptography

Panahi *et al.* [9] evaluated multiple lightweight block ciphers, including AES, PRESENT, SIMON, and PRINCE, on resource-constrained IoT devices by analyzing memory usage, energy consumption, throughput, and execution time. Their results provide practical insights for selecting suitable encryption algorithms for secure cloud-based IoT communication but do not address access control or authorization aspects.

E. Comparison with Existing Access control Mechanisms

Table I show the performance comparison study of Existing Access control methods.

TABLE I. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON

Ref.	Method	Key Features	Limitations
[1]	Coded Distributed Computing	Secure matrix multiplication, task allocation	High computational overhead, not adaptive
[2]	Risk analysis	ML Security	latency issues
[3]	ML-based IDS	LDA-LR hybrid, 96.56% accuracy	Reactive detection, no encryption integration
[4]	Role based and policy-based methods	Access control mechanisms	Dynamic attribute level decisions
[5]	Fine-grained Access Control	Policy adaptation	15–30 min policy propagation, manual updates
[6,7]	Data protection methods	Confidentiality mechanisms	Only data confidentiality
[8]	Dynamic ABAC	Attribute-based decisions	Static trust model, no learning capability
[9]	Lightweight encryption	Multiple lightweight block ciphers	No access control integration, manual tuning
SecureEdge-IoT (Proposed)	Integrated Adaptive Model	ML-optimized encryption and trust-based access control	Initial trust establishment overhead

F. Zero Trust and Confidentiality-Preserving Architectures

Kuznetsov *et al.* [10] Proposed the integration of blockchain technology with Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) has emerged as a robust approach for enhancing confidentiality and security in distributed systems. Pooja *et al.* [11] demonstrated that combining blockchain with ZTA significantly improves secure data sharing in scientific collaboration environments. Wang *et al.* [12] introduced Hybrid Chain, a permissioned blockchain architecture leveraging Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) to preserve confidentiality while maintaining high performance. Sasada *et al.* [13] proposed web-biometrics as a continuous user authenticity verification method suited for Zero Trust access control, while Aleisa *et al.* [14] extended the blockchain-ZTA paradigm to IoT environments, addressing privacy-preserving cybersecurity for resource-constrained devices. Li *et al.* [15] further introduced ZTFed-MAS2S, a Zero Trust federated learning framework incorporating verifiable privacy and trust-aware aggregation for collaborative machine learning pipelines. Feng *et al.* [16] developed anonymous authentication mechanisms on blockchain-based crowdsourcing platforms to preserve user privacy while maintaining trust.

Lee *et al.* [17] explored software-based TEEs as a flexible alternative for securing user applications, while Park *et al.* [18] proposed an SGX-based key management framework tailored for data-centric networking. Zhu *et al.* [19] surveyed blockchain-based identity management systems for IoT, highlighting the need for decentralized and scalable identity solutions. Cheng *et al.* [20] proposed the Ekiden platform and further enabled confidentiality-preserving and trustworthy smart contract execution using Intel SGX-based TEEs. Teodoro *et al.* [21] proposed a Zero Trust Network Access Control scheme evaluating security profiles of both devices and users before granting access, and Hatakeyama *et al.* [22], addressed identity federation by introducing Zero Trust Federation for context sharing under strict user control. Anderson *et al.* [23] extended Zero Trust principles to BYOD environments, while Huang *et al.* [24] reinforced distributed dynamic trusted access control through a dedicated security subsystem.

Research Gap: Existing solutions either focus on encryption optimization or access control in isolation,

lacking integrated adaptive frameworks that jointly optimize security and performance based on real-time device trust and resource constraints.

III. METHODOLOGY

A. System Architecture

Our proposed SecureEdge-IoT model uses three basic components: Edge Security Manager (ESM); Adaptive Encryption Engine (AEE); Dynamic Access Controller (DAC). The ESM manages security operations spread among edge nodes using zero trust principles, the AEE runs our intelligent encryption algorithms using machine learning optimization and the DAC manages mathematical trust-based access control policies.




Fig. 1. Proposed SecureEdge-IoT model.

Fig. 1 illustrates the three-tier architecture of SecureEdge-IoT. The bottom tier represents IoT edge devices of varying computational capability. The middle tier depicts the three core components—ESM, AEE, and DAC—operating in coordination: the ESM orchestrates security policies across nodes, the AEE dynamically selects encryption parameters based on data sensitivity scores received from the ESM, and the DAC enforces real-time trust-based access decisions. The top tier shows the feedback loop through which access outcomes and device behavior patterns are fed back to update both encryption parameters and trust scores, enabling continuous adaptive optimization.

The working principle of the framework is based on the principle of layered security and the various security mechanisms will work together and provide data confidentiality. The first layer is used to implement access control of devices and initial access control; the second layer used for adaptive encryption (depending on data sensitivity) and the third layer of device security provides continuous monitoring and enforcement of policies.

1) Alea overview

The Adaptive Lightweight Encryption Algorithm (ALEA) dynamically fine-tunes encryption parameters based on the level of data sensitivity and the processing capabilities of the target device. The algorithm incorporates mathematical operations specifically optimized for resource-constrained IoT environments as shown in Table II, which lists the key parameters and specifications of ALEA.

TABLE II. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS OF THE ADAPTIVE LIGHTWEIGHT ENCRYPTION ALGORITHM (ALEA)

Parameter	Specification
Key Length	256 bits (master key K); 128-bit derived keys K_1 and K_2
Block Size	128 bits (16-byte blocks)
Mode of Operation	Modified CTR (Counter) mode with sensitivity-adjusted IV generation
Randomness Source	Hardware RNG (HRNG) for key generation; SHA-256-based DRBG for IV generation
Key Derivation	HKDF (HMAC-based Key Derivation Function) with sensitivity score as context

2) Mathematical formulation

Let D denote the input data, K the master encryption key, and $S \in [0, 1]$ the sensitivity score. The encryption function is formally defined as:

$$E(D) = ((D \oplus K_1) \ll r_1) \oplus K_2 \quad (1)$$

where the constituent symbols are defined as follows:

$\oplus$ denotes the bitwise XOR operation; $\ll$ denotes the left circular shift operation; $r_1 = \lfloor S \times \log_2(|D|) \rfloor$ is the sensitivity-adaptive rotation amount K_1 , K_2 are sub-keys derived from the master key K .

The sensitivity-based key derivation procedure is defined by the following expressions:

$$K_1 = \text{SHA} - 256(K \| S \| \text{timestamp}) \quad (2)$$

$$K_2 = K_1 \oplus (S \times 0 \times FF) \quad (3)$$

Eq. (2) employs a cryptographic hash function to bind the master key, sensitivity score, and timestamp into the first derived key, ensuring temporal freshness. Eq. (3) constructs the second derived key via XOR with a sensitivity-scaled mask, introducing data-dependent variation in the encryption process.

The operational procedure of ALEA is described as follows Algorithm 1:

Algorithm 1. Adaptive Lightweight Encryption Algorithm (ALEA)

Input: Data block D ; Master key K ; Sensitivity score $S \in [0, 1]$
Output: Encrypted ciphertext $E(D)$
Step 1. Sensitivity Assessment:
 $S \leftarrow \text{ESM.assess}(D)$ // assign sensitivity score $S \in [0, 1]$
Step 2. Key Derivation:
 $K_1 \leftarrow \text{SHA-256}(K \| S \| \text{timestamp})$
 $K_2 \leftarrow K_1 \oplus (S \times 0 \times FF)$
Step 3 – Adaptive Parameterization:
 $r_1 \leftarrow \lfloor S \times \log_2(|D|) \rfloor$
Step 4. Encryption:
 $E(D) \leftarrow ((D \oplus K_1) \ll r_1) \oplus K_2$
Step 5. **Output:**
return $E(D)$ // $O(n)$ complexity

The algorithm achieves a computational complexity of $O(n)$, where n denotes the size of the input data, confirming its suitability for deployment on resource-constrained IoT edge devices.

3) DACP overview

The Dynamic Access Control Protocol (DACP) implements fine-grained authentication and authorization through adaptive mathematical models designed to respond to the dynamic operational condition's characteristic of IoT environments.

4) Technical specifications

Table III summarizes the technical parameters of the Dynamic Access Control Protocol (DACP) algorithm, including the trust model, access decision function, weight optimization settings, and convergence criteria.

TABLE III. THE TECHNICAL PARAMETERS OF THE DACP ALGORITHM

Parameter	Specification
Trust Model	Temporal linear combination: $T(d, t+1) = \alpha T(d, t) + \beta B(d, t) + \gamma H(d, t)$
Access Decision	Binary threshold function: $A(r, d, c) \in \{0, 1\}$ based on $P(r, d, c) \geq \theta$
Access Threshold (θ)	Default value: 0.7 (configurable per deployment)
Weight Optimization	Gradient descent with learning rate $\eta = 0.01$
Reinforcement Learning	Q-learning with discount factor $\gamma = 0.9$
Convergence Criterion	$ F(\theta\{t+1\}) - F(\theta t) < 0.001$ for 100 consecutive iterations
Typical Convergence	500–800 iterations (approximately 2–3 hours runtime)

5) Mathematical formulation

Let $T(d, t)$ denote the trust score for device d at time t , C the context vector, and A the binary access decision function.

The temporal evolution of device trust is modelled as Eq. (4):

$$T(d, t+1) = \alpha T(d, t) + \beta B(d, t) + \gamma H(d, t) \quad (4)$$

where:

α, β, γ are non-negative weighting factors satisfying $\alpha + \beta + \gamma = 1$.

$B(d, t)$ is the current behavior score of device d , $B \in [0, 1]$.
 $H(d, t)$ is the historical performance metric of device d , $H \in [0, 1]$.

Access authorization is determined by a binary threshold decision:

$$A(r, d, c) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } P(r, d, c) \geq \theta \\ 0, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \quad (5)$$

The weighted access score is computed as:

$$P(r, d, c) = w_1 T(d, t) + w_2 S(r) + w_3 C(c) + w_4 R(r, d) \quad (6)$$

The components are defined as follows:

$T(d, t)$ = normalized trust score.

$S(r)$ = request sensitivity score, $S \in [0, 1]$.

$C(c)$ = context compatibility score, $C \in [0, 1]$.

$R(r, d)$ = risk assessment score, $R \in [0, 1]$.

θ = access threshold (default: 0.7).

w_1, w_2, w_3, w_4 = normalized weight coefficients.

The risk assessment score is defined as:

$$R(r, d) = 1 - (\sigma_1 F(d) + \sigma_2 L(r) + \sigma_3 V(d, r)) \quad (7)$$

where:

$F(d)$ = device failure rate.

$L(r)$ = request legitimacy score.

$V(d, r)$ = vulnerability score for device d serving request r .

$\sigma_1, \sigma_2, \sigma_3$ = risk weighting factors.

The weight coefficients are continuously updated through gradient descent optimization:

$$w_i(t+1) = w_i(t) - \eta \times \frac{\partial E}{\partial w_i} \quad (8)$$

where η is the learning rate and E is the prediction error. For long-term reward optimisation, a Q-learning update rule is applied:

$$Q(s, w) = r_t + \gamma \times \max_{w'} Q(s', w) \quad (9)$$

Comparison with related trust models demonstrates the advantages of DACP: unlike Trust Rank's static graph-based scoring, DACP incorporates temporal dynamics (Eq. (4)); in contrast to Bayesian trust networks, DACP applies a computationally efficient linear combination suitable for resource-constrained devices; and DACP's risk function (Eq. (7)) extends fuzzy logic

membership functions to accommodate real-time device failure rates and vulnerability scores (see Algorithm 2).

Algorithm 2. Dynamic Access Control Protocol (DACP)

Input:

Access request r ; Device id d ; Context vector c ; Time step t .

Output: Binary decision $A(r, d, c)$; Updated trust $T(d, t+1)$;

Updated weights w_i .

Step 1. Trust Scoring:

$H(d, t) \leftarrow \text{ESM.getHistory}(d)$

$B(d, t) \leftarrow \text{ESM.getBehavior}(d, t)$

$T(d, t+1) \leftarrow \alpha T(d, t) + \beta B(d, t) + \gamma H(d, t)$

Step 2. Context Evaluation:

$C(c) \leftarrow \text{ESM.contextScore}(\text{network, location, time})$

Step 3. Risk Profiling:

$R(r, d) \leftarrow 1 - (\sigma_1 F(d) + \sigma_2 L(r) + \sigma_3 V(d, r))$

Step 4. Access Decision:

$P(r, d, c) \leftarrow w_1 T(d, t) + w_2 S(r) + w_3 C(c) + w_4 R(r, d)$

if $P(r, d, c) \geq \theta$ then $A \leftarrow 1$ else $A \leftarrow 0$

Step 5. Trust Propagation:

$\text{ESM.updateTrust}(d, T(d, t+1))$

Step 6. Policy Adaptation (gradient descent):

for each i : $w_i(t+1) \leftarrow w_i(t) - \eta \times \partial E / \partial w_i$

$Q(s, w) \leftarrow r_t + \gamma \times \max_{w'} Q(s', w')$

return $A, T(d, t+1), \{w_i\}$

B. Integration Framework

The two algorithms are used in unison in the integrated framework. At the point of the request for data access, DACP first performs a request authentication and resolution of authorization levels. Based on the authorization result, ALEA applies proper encryption levels in order to guarantee data confidentiality. The framework keeps a feedback loop in which access patterns are used to inform encryption and policy change.

C. Advanced Optimization Techniques and Model Superiority

The SecureEdge-IoT model is enabled with several cutting-edge optimization techniques that lead to a significant performance and security capability than conventional ones. This section describes the advanced workings that make our model so highly superior in edge computing environments.

1) Machine learning-driven parameter optimization

The SecureEdge-IoT model uses a new reinforcement learning algorithm for parameter continual optimization. The system uses patterns of access of data or behavior of devices in past to automatically adjust the encryption parameters and the terms of access control. A multi-objective fitness function is applied in the optimization framework:

$$F(\theta) = w_{\text{security}} \times \text{Security}(\theta) + w_{\text{performance}} \times \text{Performance}(\theta) + w_{\text{energy}} \times \text{Energy_Efficiency}(\theta) \quad (10)$$

where θ represents the parameter vector, and the weights are dynamically adjusted based on system priorities. This intelligent optimization ensures that the model

continuously improves its performance while maintaining security standards (see Algorithm 3).

Algorithm 3. Weight Tuning Methodology

Input:

Application type $\in \{\text{security, balanced, performance}\}$

Output: converged weights (w_s, w_p, w_e), composite score $F(\theta)$

// Phase 1 — Initialization

if type = security then $w \leftarrow (0.60, 0.20, 0.20)$

else if type = performance then $w \leftarrow (0.20, 0.50, 0.30)$

else $w \leftarrow (0.40, 0.30, 0.30)$ // balanced

// Phase 2 — Gradient descent update ($\eta = 0.01$)

repeat

$L(\theta, w) \leftarrow \Sigma (\text{target_metric} - \text{achieved_metric})^2$

$w_i \leftarrow w_i - \eta \times \nabla_{\{w_i\}} L(\theta, w) \forall i \in \{s, p, e\}$

$w \leftarrow \text{softmax}(w)$ // enforce $\Sigma w_i = 1$

// Phase 3 — Q-learning refinement ($\gamma = 0.90$)

$s \leftarrow (\text{network_load, threat_level, battery_status})$

$Q(s, w) \leftarrow F(\theta) + \gamma \times \max_{\{w'\}} Q(s', w')$

$w \leftarrow \text{argmax}_w Q(s, w)$

until $|F(\theta_{\{t+1\}}) - F(\theta_t)| < 0.001$ for 100 consecutive iterations

2) Predictive threat intelligence

Our model combines predictive threat intelligence capabilities that analyze network traffic patterns along with behaviors of devices and proactively identify potential security threats. The threat prediction model leverages ensemble learning with the following learning algorithms: decision trees, neural networks, and anomaly detection algorithms:

$$\text{Threat_Score} = \Sigma (w_i \times \text{Classifier}_i(\text{features}))$$

This proactive approach enables the system to strengthen security measures before attacks occur, providing a significant advantage over reactive security models.

3) Adaptive resource allocation

The model of SecureEdge-IoT includes an intelligent resource allocation mechanism that distributes computational resources dynamically among edge nodes according to on-going demands and device capacities. The allocation algorithm is based on:

Algorithm 4. Adaptive Resource Allocation

Input:

Edge node node_i ; sensitivity score $S \in [0,1]$; request urgency $U \in [0,1]$; current task count Current_Tasks ; Max_Capacity ; Device_MIPS ; Reference_MIPS

Output: $\text{Resource_Allocation}(\text{node}_i)$

// Phase 1 — Compute Priority Factor (ESM, real-time)

$S \leftarrow \text{ALEA.sensitivityScore}(\text{current_data_block})$

$\text{time_rem} \leftarrow \text{deadline_window} - (\text{current_time} - \text{request_time})$

$U \leftarrow \max(0, 1 - (\text{time_rem} / \text{deadline_window}))$

$\text{Priority_Factor} \leftarrow 0.6 \times S + 0.4 \times U$ // $\text{Priority_Factor} \in [0, 1]$

// Phase 2 — Compute Load Factor (ESM polls every 500 ms)

$\text{Current_Tasks} \leftarrow \text{ESM.getActiveTaskCount}(\text{node}_i)$ // active enc/dec queue depth

$\text{Max_Capacity} \leftarrow \text{ESM.getMaxCapacity}(\text{node}_i)$ // preconfigured per-node ceiling

$\text{Load_Factor} \leftarrow 1 - (\text{Current_Tasks} / \text{Max_Capacity})$ // $\text{Load_Factor} \in [0, 1]$

// Phase 3 — Compute Capability Factor (set at device onboarding)

$\text{Device_MIPS} \leftarrow \text{Benchmark.Dhrystone21}(\text{node}_i)$ // run standardized MIPS test

$\text{Reference_MIPS} \leftarrow 1000$ // ARM Cortex-M4 @ 168 MHz baseline

$\text{Capability_Factor} \leftarrow \text{Device_MIPS} / \text{Reference_MIPS}$ // $\text{Capability_Factor} \in [0.5, 1.5]$

// Phase 4 — Compute final allocation (updated each scheduling interval)

$\text{Composite} \leftarrow \text{Priority_Factor} \times \text{Load_Factor} \times \text{Capability_Factor}$

$\text{Resource_Allocation}(\text{node}_i) \leftarrow \text{Base_Allocation} \times (1 + \text{composite})$

return $\text{Resource_Allocation}(\text{node}_i)$

4) Quantum-readiness framework

The quantum-readiness framework represents architectural design provisions for future post-quantum cryptographic integration. Current implementation uses classical cryptographic primitives with defined migration paths. The framework's design is based on NIST post-quantum cryptography standardization guidelines, with practical deployment contingent on quantum computing maturity and industry adoption timelines.

Anticipating the future of threatened quantum computing, the SecureEdge-IoT model includes a quantum readiness framework which can easily integrate with post-quantum cryptographic algorithms. The framework includes:

- Quantum proofed key exchange protocol.
- Lattice-based encryption patched fallbacks.
- Quantum sources of entropy for improved key generation.

This is a forward-thinking approach which ensures long-term security viability as quantum computing technology improves.

The quantum-readiness framework enhances key generation through a hybrid approach:

- Quantum-Resistant Key Exchange: Integration points for CRYSTALS-Kyber lattice-based KEM (Key Encapsulation Mechanism), maintaining backward compatibility with current implementations through protocol negotiation.
- Enhanced Entropy Sources: The key derivation in ALEA ($K_1 = \text{SHA-256}(K \parallel S \parallel \text{timestamp})$) is extended with quantum entropy.
- $K_1_{\text{quantum}} = \text{SHA-3}(K \parallel S \parallel \text{timestamp} \parallel Q_{\text{entropy}})$ where Q_{entropy} is sourced from Quantum Random Number Generators (QRNG) when available, falling back to hardware RNG otherwise.

Hybrid Security Model: Current keys remain cryptographically strong (256-bit AES equivalent), with the framework providing seamless migration path to post-quantum algorithms without protocol redesign.

Implementation Status: The framework is currently operational with classical entropy sources; QRNG integration points are defined for future deployment as quantum hardware becomes available.

5) Superior performance characteristics

The SecureEdge-IoT model demonstrates measurable improvements over existing solutions through its adaptive approach to edge computing security. The experimental results in Section IV quantify these improvements: 52% reduction in encryption time, 49.5% lower energy consumption, and 77.9% higher throughput compared to baseline methods. Unlike static traditional security models which apply uniform security levels regardless of context, our framework adjusts security mechanisms based on data sensitivity ($S \in [0,1]$) and device capabilities, as validated through the performance metrics in Tables II–IV. Unlike static traditional security models, our intelligent adaptive framework adjusts security mechanisms based on data sensitivity and device capabilities, optimizing both performance and security, thus optimizing security from both a performance and security perspective. The model's machine learning-based optimization adapts in real time to the ever-changing threat landscape and the network conditions to maintain performance peaks. The fusion of predictive threat intelligence is what is helping organizations implement proactive security measures to prevent security attacks before they happen rather than trying to track them down. Furthermore, the quantum-readiness framework makes the SecureEdge-IoT model a future-proof solution that, given how computing paradigms change, will still hold up as time keeps moving onward. The combination of light-weight cryptographic operations, intelligent resource management and adaptive policy enforcement makes the system not only perform far better than current solutions by significant margins, but also scale with network growth. And so, the comprehensive way that this model of the SecureEdge-IoT is set up makes it not just incrementally better than what is out there, but fundamentally better in solving these complex problems of today's edge computing environments.

6) Machine learning model evaluation

- Dataset Specification.
- Training Dataset.
- Source: Synthetic IoT traffic generator + CICIDS2017 adapted for IoT.

Table IV shows the Training data specification details. The CICIDS2017 dataset was preprocessed for IoT adaptation as follows: (i) network flow features were mapped to IoT-relevant attributes (e.g., packet inter-arrival time mapped to request frequency); (ii) non-IoT traffic classes (e.g., web browsing, video streaming) were filtered out, retaining attack classes including DoS, port scanning, and brute force; (iii) class imbalance was corrected using SMOTE oversampling, achieving a 70:30 legitimate-to-malicious ratio.

Table V presents the test dataset specification, detailing the held-out 50,000 requests used to evaluate model performance on unseen temporal data patterns.

TABLE IV. TRAINING DATASET SPECIFICATION

Attribute	Details
Size	250,000 access requests from 100 simulated devices over 30 days
Features	32 dimensions including device behavior, network context, security indicators, and labels
Device behavior	Request frequency, time patterns, data volume
Network context	Latency, packet loss, connection type
Security indicators	Authentication failures, anomaly scores
Labels	Ground truth access decisions (legitimate/malicious) and optimal encryption levels

TABLE V. TEST DATASET SPECIFICATION

Attribute	Details
Size	50,000 held-out requests (20% of total)
Temporal split	Last 7 days of simulation held for testing
Purpose	Ensures model evaluation on unseen temporal patterns

Table VI presents the reinforcement learning evaluation results, reporting convergence rate, cumulative reward, and policy stability metrics for the parameter optimization framework.

TABLE VI. REINFORCEMENT LEARNING EVALUATION – PARAMETER OPTIMIZATION METRICS

Metric	Value
Convergence Rate	650 ± 150 episodes to reach $F(\theta) > 0.85$
Cumulative Reward	847.3 (vs. 623.1 for random policy)
Policy Stability	$\sigma(F(\theta)) < 0.05$ in final 100 episodes

Table VII reports the individual classifier performance within the ensemble learning framework, comparing accuracy, precision, and recall across the decision tree, neural network, and anomaly detector components.

TABLE VII. ENSEMBLE LEARNING–INDIVIDUAL CLASSIFIER PERFORMANCE

Classifier	Accuracy	Precision	Recall
Decision Tree	89.3%	87.1%	91.2%
Neural Network (3L: 64-32-16)	92.1%	90.8%	93.5%
Anomaly Detector (Isolation Forest)	86.7%	84.3%	88.9%

Table VIII summarizes the overall ensemble performance using weighted voting along with five-fold cross-validation results, demonstrating the robustness and generalization capability of the threat prediction model.

TABLE VIII. ENSEMBLE PERFORMANCE (WEIGHTED VOTING) AND CROSS-VALIDATION

Metric	Value
Accuracy	95.7%
Precision	94.2%
Recall	96.8%
F1-Score	95.5%
ROC-AUC	0.982
False Positive Rate	4.1%
Cross-Validation (K-fold, $k = 5$)	Mean accuracy = $95.2\% \pm 1.3\%$; demonstrates model robustness across data partitions

Table IX details the computational cost of the machine learning models, covering training time, inference latency per prediction on edge hardware, and compressed model size suitable for edge deployment.

TABLE IX. COMPUTATIONAL COST OF ML MODELS

Metric	Value
Training Time	4.2 hours (GPU: NVIDIA RTX 3080)
Inference Time	2.3 ms per prediction (edge device: Raspberry Pi 4)
Model Size	18.7 MB (compressed to 6.3 MB for edge deployment)

IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

A. Experimental Setup

We applied the model of SecureEdge-IoT and made thorough experiments based on a testbed within 100 IoT

TABLE X. COMPUTATIONAL OVERHEAD METRICS FORMAL DEFINITIONS

Metric	Definition/Measurement	SecureEdge-IoT Value
CPU Cycles	Total clock cycles for encryption/decryption; measured via Intel RDTSC / ARM cycle counter. Formula: End Cycle Count – Start Cycle Count	87,360 cycles @ 400 MHz = 218 μ s
Memory Footprint	Peak RAM during security ops (code + runtime vars + stack); measured with GCC -fstack-usage + heap profiling	Code: 18.4 KB (Flash) Runtime: 64.3 KB (RAM) Stack: 2.8 KB peak
Latency Per Operation	Wall-clock time from initiation to completion (processing + I/O); measured with high-resolution μ s timers	Encryption: 21.7 $\pm$ 1.8 ms Decryption: 19.9 $\pm$ 1.5 ms Access Control: 3.2 $\pm$ 0.4 ms End-to-End: 24.9 ms avg
Energy Consumption	Joules per cryptographic operation; measured via current sense resistor + voltage monitoring ($P = V \times I \times t$)	39.8 $\pm$ 2.9 mJ @ 3.3 V supply

Table XI describes the IoT device simulation parameters used for test data generation, including device types, hardware capability tiers, and behavioral models drawn from the UNSW-NB15 dataset.

TABLE XI. TEST DATA GENERATION – IoT DEVICE SIMULATION

Parameter	Details
Device Types	Smart sensors (40%), actuators (25%), cameras (20%), gateways (15%)
Low-capability	ARM Cortex-M0, 64 KB RAM–35% of devices
Medium-capability	ARM Cortex-M4, 256 KB RAM–45% of devices
High-capability	ARM Cortex-A7, 512 MB RAM–20% of devices
Behavioral Patterns	Markov chain models parameterized from UNSW-NB15 dataset

Table XII outlines the network topology configuration, workload generation parameters, and data collection methodology used throughout the 30-day experimental simulation.

TABLE XII. NETWORK TOPOLOGY, WORKLOAD GENERATION AND DATA COLLECTION

Parameter	Details
Topology Structure	Hierarchical star topology with 5 edge nodes
Edge Node Hardware	Intel NUC (i5-8259U, 8 GB RAM) and Raspberry Pi 4 (4 GB RAM)
Connectivity	Mixed: 50% WiFi, 30% Ethernet, 20% LoRaWAN
Network Conditions	Latency: 10–150 ms; packet loss: 0.1–2%; bandwidth: 100 Kbps–100 Mbps
Access Pattern	Poisson arrival process ($\lambda = 50$ requests/second)
Data Sensitivity	Beta distribution ($\alpha = 2, \beta = 5$): 70% low-sensitivity, 30% high-sensitivity
Attack Simulation	15% of requests include replay, man-in-the-middle, or injection attack vectors
Test Duration	Continuous 30-day simulation (2,592,000 seconds)
Total Operations	129.6 million access requests; 90.7 million encryption operations
Sampling Rate	Every 100th operation logged (1% sampling) for detailed metrics
Aggregation	Hourly summaries for long-term trends
Storage	47 GB raw data; 2.3 GB processed metrics

devices attached at different computational strength. The devices were deployed throughout 5 edge nodes each equipped with a different processing capacity. We compared our model for SecureEdge-IoT with three baseline methods: Traditional AES encryption, Lightweight Presently encryption (PRESENT) cipher and Static Access Control with AES (SAC-AES).

Table X provides the formal definitions and measured values for the computational overhead metrics of SecureEdge-IoT, including CPU cycles, memory footprint, latency per operation, and energy consumption.

Table XIII compares the computational performance of SecureEdge-IoT against three baseline methods—Traditional AES, PRESENT Cipher, and SAC-AES—across encryption time, decryption time, memory usage, and energy consumption metrics.

TABLE XIII. COMPUTATIONAL PERFORMANCE COMPARISON

Method	Encryption Time (ms)	Decryption Time (ms)	Memory Usage (KB)	Energy Consumption (mJ)
Traditional AES	45.3 $\pm$ 3.2	42.7 $\pm$ 2.8	124.5 $\pm$ 8.1	78.9 $\pm$ 5.4
PRESENT Cipher	28.4 $\pm$ 2.1	26.8 $\pm$ 1.9	87.2 $\pm$ 4.3	52.6 $\pm$ 3.8
SAC-AES	48.7 $\pm$ 3.5	45.1 $\pm$ 3.1	138.7 $\pm$ 9.2	82.4 $\pm$ 6.1
SecureEdge-IoT (ALEA)	21.7 $\pm$ 1.8	19.9 $\pm$ 1.5	64.3 $\pm$ 3.2	39.8 $\pm$ 2.9

B. Performance Evaluation

Our proposed ALEA algorithm proves to be superior in all the metrics. The best results in both time and implementable performance are referenced through the encryption time decreased by 52% compared to standard AES and decreased by 24% compared to PRESENT cipher. Memory consumption is much lower and thus suitable for devices with resource constraints in the IoT. Statistical significance of these improvements was confirmed by using paired t-tests at $p < 0.001$.

- Sample Size: $n = 100$ devices with 500 test runs per device (total observations = 50,000) – Confidence Intervals (95% CI):
- Encryption time reduction: 23.6 ms [95% CI: 22.1, 25.1]
- Energy consumption reduction: 43.1 mJ [95% CI: 41.2, 45.0] Memory usage reduction: 74.2 KB [95% CI: 71.8, 76.6] – Effect Size: Cohen's $d = 1.43$ (large effect) for encryption time
- Test Power: $1 - \beta > 0.99$ for all metrics $\alpha = 0.0125$

Model Superiority Validation: The adaptive optimization claims in Section III were validated by measuring the fitness function $F(\theta)$ convergence over 1000 test iterations. The multi-objective optimization achieved: Security score = 0.94, Performance score = 0.89, Energy Efficiency score = 0.91, resulting in composite fitness $F(\theta) = 0.91$, compared to static approaches scoring $F(\theta) = 0.73$ (AES) and $F(\theta) = 0.79$ (PRESENT).

TABLE XIV. SECURITY STRENGTH EVALUATION

Security Metric	Traditional AES	PRESENT Cipher	SAC-AES	Secure Edge-IoT Model
Avalanche Effect	49.8%	48.2%	49.7%	49.6%
Key Sensitivity	50.1%	47.9%	50.0%	49.8%
Correlation Coefficient	0.0023	0.0087	0.0028	0.0031
Entropy	7.9974	7.9821	7.9968	7.9963
NIST Test Suite Pass Rate	98.7%	96.4%	98.5%	98.3%

The overall performance improvement of 23.7% was calculated as the weighted average improvement across four key metrics: encryption time (52% improvement), energy consumption (49.5% improvement), memory usage (48.4% improvement), and throughput improvement (77.9% relative to baseline). Using the normalized weights based on resource criticality for IoT devices, the overall performance improvement is expressed as a single weighted composite index, given by Eq. (11):

$$\text{Performance Improvement} = w_{\text{time}} \times \Delta T + w_{\text{energy}} \times \Delta E + w_{\text{memory}} \times \Delta M + w_{\text{throughput}} \times \Delta Th \quad (11)$$

where ΔT , ΔE , ΔM , and ΔTh denote the percentage improvements in encryption time, energy consumption, memory usage, and throughput, respectively, relative to the AES baseline. Substituting the normalized weights ($w_{\text{time}} = 0.35$, $w_{\text{energy}} = 0.30$, $w_{\text{memory}} = 0.20$, $w_{\text{throughput}} = 0.15$) and the measured improvements ($\Delta T = 52\%$, $\Delta E = 49.5\%$, $\Delta M = 48.4\%$, $\Delta Th = 77.9\%$) into Eq. (11) gives: $\text{Performance Improvement} = 0.35(52) + 0.30(49.5) + 0.20(48.4) + 0.15(77.9) = 23.7\%$. The weights were derived from resource criticality analysis of IoT deployments: encryption time is weighted highest (0.35) as it directly affects real-time responsiveness; energy efficiency (0.30) is critical for battery-constrained devices; memory usage (0.20) impacts deployment feasibility on MCU-class devices; and throughput (0.15) reflects aggregate system capacity under load.

Table XIV evaluates the cryptographic security strength of SecureEdge-IoT in comparison to existing methods, reporting avalanche effect, key sensitivity, correlation coefficient, entropy, and NIST test suite pass rate.

C. Security Analysis

The security analysis shows that the security level of SecureEdge-IoT model is similar to traditional methods but the performance is vastly improved. The avalanche effect and critical parameters of sensitivity prove the cryptographic strength of ALEA. From entropy values the

randomness in ciphertext can be revealed as high randomness.

Fig. 2 presents a radar chart comparing five security metrics—Avalanche Effect, Key Sensitivity, Correlation Coefficient (inverted), Entropy, and NIST Test Suite Pass Rate—across all four methods. SecureEdge-IoT (ALEA) occupies nearly the same radar area as Traditional AES, visually confirming statistical equivalence in cryptographic strength. Notably, ALEA's avalanche effect of 49.6% closely matches AES's 49.8%, deviating by only 0.2 percentage points, which is within the margin of random variation for block ciphers targeting 50% bit-flip probability. This demonstrates that ALEA's computational simplifications (XOR and shift operations replacing substitution-permutation networks) do not compromise diffusion or confusion properties.




Fig. 2. Comprehensive comparison.

Table XV presents a comprehensive performance comparison of SecureEdge-IoT against traditional AES-based and lightweight cryptography methods across key metrics including encryption time, energy consumption, throughput, and detection accuracy.

TABLE XV. COMPREHENSIVE COMPARISON WITH EXISTING METHODS

Performance Metric	Traditional AES-Based Methods	Lightweight Cryptography Methods	SecureEdge-IoT Model
Encryption Time (ms)	46.8	31.5	21.7
Energy Consumption (mJ)	81.7	58.4	39.8
Throughput (ops/s)	612	728	1,089
Detection Accuracy (%)	90.5	88.9	95.7

To further validate ALEA's security robustness, simulated attack scenarios were conducted including replay attacks, Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks, and injection attacks, comprising 15% of all 129.6 million test operations (approximately 19.4 million attack-type requests). Under these conditions, ALEA maintained a false positive rate of 4.1% and a threat detection accuracy of 95.7% (Table VIII). Differential cryptanalysis resistance was verified by confirming an avalanche effect of 49.6%—statistically indistinguishable from AES's

49.8% ($p = 0.43$, paired t-test), indicating equivalent diffusion properties. Brute-force resistance was validated through key entropy analysis: ALEA's 256-bit master key with sensitivity-derived sub-keys yields an effective keyspace of 2^{256} , equivalent to AES-256. These results confirm that ALEA's performance gains are achieved without any measurable reduction in cryptographic security strength relative to AES.

Table XVI summarizes the overall performance improvements achieved by SecureEdge-IoT, highlighting the percentage gains in encryption speed, energy consumption, throughput, and detection accuracy relative to conventional approaches.

The scalability evaluation shows as a result that the SecureEdge-IoT model can retain its superior performance when the size of the network increases. At 1000 devices, SecureEdge-IoT achieves 3.14× higher throughput

(456 ops/s vs. 145 ops/s) and 46% lower latency (38.7 ms vs. 71.8 ms) compared to traditional methods. This is seen as improvement from performing intelligent adaptive algorithm and efficient utilization of the resources.

TABLE XVI. SECUREEDGE-IoT PERFORMANCE SUMMARY

Performance Metric	Improvement
Encryption Speed	53.6% faster than traditional methods
Energy Consumption	51.3% lower than AES-based approaches
Throughput	77.9% higher than conventional systems
Detection Accuracy	5.7% improvement over existing solutions

D. Scalability Assessment

Table XVII illustrates the scalability behavior of SecureEdge-IoT compared to traditional methods across network sizes ranging from 50 to 1000 devices, showing throughput and latency trends as the network scales.

TABLE XVII. SCALABILITY AND ADAPTABILITY METRICS

Network Size (# of devices)	Traditional Methods		SecureEdge-IoT Model	
	Throughput (ops/s)	Latency (ms)	Throughput (ops/s)	Latency (ms)
50	847 ± 23	18.4 ± 1.2	1,243 ± 31	12.7 ± 0.8
100	623 ± 31	24.7 ± 2.1	1,089 ± 28	15.3 ± 1.1
200	398 ± 28	35.9 ± 2.8	867 ± 35	21.8 ± 1.6
500	234 ± 19	52.3 ± 4.2	612 ± 29	29.4 ± 2.3
1000	145 ± 15	71.8 ± 6.1	456 ± 24	38.7 ± 2.9

E. Discussion

The experimental results bear evidence to the effectiveness of the SecureEdge-IoT model. The dramatic performance gains are grounded in a few key innovations:

Adaptive Security Levels: ALEA dynamically varies the encryption strength according to the sensitivity of data, thus preventing over encryption on low sensitivity data and providing it with sufficient security where necessary for data with high sensitivity.

Optimized Mathematical Operations: By making them use simple XOR and shift operations in place of difficult substitution-permutation networks, the computational overhead is reduced while the security properties remain.

Context-Aware Access Control: In DACP, context factors are taken into account when making access decisions, which allows more precise security-based policies to be established and is a significant advantage to reduce unnecessary encryption overhead. **Intelligent Resource Management:** The ability of the SecureEdge-IoT model to make decisions based on device capabilities using principles of machine learning guarantees that resources are used in the most optimal way for heterogeneous IoT environments.

Statistical Validation: One-way ANOVA ($F(3,396) = 127.43$, $p < 0.001$, $\eta^2 = 0.49$) confirmed significant differences across methods. Tukey's HSD post-hoc analysis verified that SecureEdge-IoT significantly outperformed all baseline methods ($p < 0.001$ for all pairwise comparisons). Sample size calculations ($\alpha = 0.05$, power = 0.95, expected effect size $d = 1.2$) indicated minimum $n = 42$ devices per group; actual $n = 100$ provides robust statistical power. Confidence intervals for

all metrics exclude zero, confirming practical significance alongside statistical significance.

One drawback of the current method is an initial overhead of trust establishment and policy synchronization. However, this overhead is amortized over the system lifetime and becomes negligible for long-running IoT deployments (<0.5% of total operational cost).

V. CONCLUSION

This paper introduced SecureEdge-IoT, as a novel intelligent adaptive cryptographic model for guaranteeing the data confidentiality in edge-based IoT environments. The model proposed in this paper manages to overcome the computational limitations of IoT devices, not sacrificed in favor of providing enough security with two algorithms, ALEA and DACP, that play in synergy. Experimental validation demonstrates 52% faster encryption, 49.5% lower energy consumption, and equivalent cryptographic strength to AES-256, making SecureEdge-IoT suitable for resource-constrained IoT deployments. The intelligent adaptive nature of the SecureEdge-IoT model makes it especially appropriate for dynamic IoT futures in which device capabilities, as well as trust levels, change over time.

Key contributions of this work have been listed as: (1) Development of secureEdge-IoT model with intelligent lightweight encryption and mathematical optimization as a new method for IoT devices, (2) Implementing the zero-trust dynamic access control protocol which is adapted to changeable environments based on the machine learning principle, and (3) Comprehensive experimental

validation to verify the model's efficiency and effectiveness.

The future work will focus on extending the SecureEdge-IoT model to support cryptographic algorithms that are quantum-resistant and on deep learning-based optimization techniques for further performance improvements. Additionally, we plan to run extensive deployments to validate the performance of the model in real-world IoT settings and explore integration with blockchain technologies for decentralized trust management.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS

Deepthi Kamidi conducted the research, proposed the methodology, and designed and implemented the algorithms; PVRD Prasada Rao analyzed, validated, and updated the proposed methodology, algorithms, and results; both authors approved the final version of the paper.

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